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The effect of the capital gains tax on the sale of capital assets and the
realization of gains on these assets have been a matter of substantial
academic and political controversy. Capital gains are only taxed when
an asset is sold, and so inclusion of gains in taxable income is largely
discretionary from the point of view of the taxpayer. As a result, sen-
sitivity to tax rates is probably greater for capital gains income than
for other kinds of income.
This sensitivity may take a number of forms. Capital gains and losses
on assets held for less than a specified time period, currently 6 months,
are taxed as ordinary income while gains and losses on assets held for
longer periods of time are taxed at lower rates. Within limits specified
by the tax law, taxpayers have an incentive to realize losses in the short
term and gains in the long term. Planning of sales around this capital
gains holding period was studied by Kaplan (1981), who concluded that
eliminating the distinction between long-term and short-term gains, and
taxing all assets under current long-term rules, would enhance capital
gains tax revenue. Fredland, Gray, and Sunley (1968) also found that
the length of the holding period had a significant effect on the timing
of asset sales.
The deferral of taxes on capital gains until realization enhances the
incentive to postpone selling assets. A taxpayer might defer selling one
asset and purchasing another with a higher pretax return because capital
gains tax on the sale makes the transaction unprofitable. This is known
as the "lock-in" effect. Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki (1980) esti-
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mated that the effect of lock-in was substantial enough to suggest that
a reduction in tax rates from their 1978 levels would increase tax rev-
enue. Their study focused on sales of common stock using 1973 tax
return data. The results mirrored those of an earlier work by Feldstein
and Yitzhaki (1977) which relied on data from the 1963-64 Federal
Reserve Board Survey of the Financial Characteristics of Consumers.
Brannon (1974) found evidence of reduced realizations of capital
gains as a result of tax rate increases in 1970 and 1971. A lock-in effect
was also identified by Auten (1979). Later Auten and Clotfelter (1979)
found a substantially greater sensitivity of capital gains realizations to
short-term fluctuations in the tax rate than to long-term, average tax
rate levels. Minarik (1981) studied the lock-in effect and concluded that
a 1% reduction in the capital gains tax rate would increase realizations,
but by substantially less than 1%. The U.S. Department of the Treasury
(1985) released a report to the Congress which presented substantially
higher estimates of the elasticity of capital gains realizations to tax
rates and concluded that the tax rate reductions of 1978 had the effect
of increasing capital gains tax revenue.
Some work has also been done on incentives to lock in capital gains
for very long periods of time. Assets held until death or contributed
to charity escape capital gains taxation under the income tax. In the
case of death, capital gains are taxed by the estate tax since estates
are subject to estate taxes on the full fair market value of the assets
they contain. Bailey (1969) and David (1968) have argued that elimi-
nating these provisions would be an efficient means of reducing the
lock-in effect by eliminating the possibility of escaping capital gains
tax.
The objective of the present paper is to examine the relationship
among capital gains tax rates, the level of realizations of long-term
gains subject to tax, and revenues from capital gains taxation over an
extended period of time. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 began an era of
high variability in the capital gains tax rate which had been relatively
constant for the preceding 15 years. Further changes in the tax reform
bills of 1976, 1978, and 1981 continued this variability.
The changes in the effective capital gains tax rate which resulted
from these laws were quite complex and often involved the interaction
of several provisions. This paper makes careful estimates of the effec-
tive marginal tax rate on capital gains for various income groups over
the period 1965-82. These detailed estimates suggest smaller variability
in rates than suggested by the maximum effective rates cited in other
studies. The first section describes the computation of the effective
capital gains tax rates and describes the impact of the various provisions
on the capital gains tax rate. The effect of these provisions is combined
using detailed tabulation data from Statistics of Income to estimate
average marginal effective tax rates for various income groups.71 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
The second section analyzes data from the sector balance sheets and
reconciliation statements of the Federal Reserve Board's Flow of Funds
series. These data provide estimates of the level and composition of
wealth of the household sector. They also estimate the change in value
of these holdings due to movements in asset prices. This section also
describes the method used to allocate these wealth values among the
various income classes studied.
The final section combines the data on the level and distribution of
wealth with the marginal tax rate series to estimate the effect of mar-
ginal tax rates on the rate of realization. These parameter estimates
are then placed in the context of a revenue-maximizing objective func-
tion to calculate the capital gains tax rate that produces the maximum
revenue for the government. The sensitivity of these estimates to econ-
ometric specification is also examined in the final section.
3.1 Capital Gains Tax Rates
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 distinguished between gains on
assets held at least 6 months and those held longer. The former were
taxed as ordinary income while the latter, termed long-term gains, were
given a 50% exclusion from taxable income. However, this exclusion
was limited to net capital gains, long-term gains in excess of short-term
losses. Therefore, to the extent that long-term gains simply cancelled
short-term losses, the long-term marginal tax rate equalled the short-
term rate, which was the same as the tax rate on ordinary income.
(There were some exceptions to this tax treatment including S.1231
gains. These gains received capital gains treatment if positive but or-
dinary income treatment if negative.)
There remains some debate regarding the proper measure of capital
gains for analysis. Minarik (1983) has argued that long-term gains in
excess of any short-term loss is the only relevant measure of gains for
considering the effect of tax rates and revenue implications. On the
other hand, some analyses of capital gains, such as that by Feldstein
and Slemrod (1982) have included net long-term capital losses in their
calculation. These net losses are permitted only limited deductibility
in the year taken, although they may be carried forward to offset future
tax liability. In general, their inclusion would tend to decrease the
apparent effectiveness of capital gains taxation in generating revenue
and raise the apparent sensitivity of taxpayers to capital gains tax rates.
Poterba (1985) examined 1982 tax return data and found that tax-
payers with net long-term gains comprised the majority of all returns
reporting capital gains or losses. He noted, however, that a sizable
fraction of taxpayers were subject to the capital loss limitation and
therefore could realize additional long-term gains without incurring any
additional current tax liability. These taxpayers are unaffected by the72 Lawrence B. Lindsey
marginal tax rate on capital gains, generate no capital gains tax liability,
and are therefore neglected in the present study.
The present study examines only long-term gains in excess of short-
term losses. The relevant marginal tax rate for most taxpayers is there-
fore half the tax rate on ordinary income as only half of such gains are
included in taxable income. (After 31 October 1978 this inclusion rate
was reduced to 40%.) The higher tax rate on inframarginal long-term
gains used to offset short-term losses is neglected. We consider only
the tax rate on marginal realizations of long-term gains for taxpayers
with long-term gains in excess of short-term losses.
Although the general rule for tax rates on long-term gains is that they
are half the ordinary rates (40% of ordinary rates after 31 October 1978),
there are a number of other provisions of the tax code which affected
the capital gains tax rate. These include the Alternative Tax Compu-
tation, the Additional Tax for Tax Preferences, the Maximum Tax on
Personal Service Income, and the Alternative Minimum Tax. We con-
sider each in turn, using detailed tabulation data from Statistics of
Income to calculate its effect on capital gains tax rates.
3.1.1 The Alternative Tax Computation
Tax rates on ordinary income over most of the period of this study
ranged up to 70%. Thus, taxation of long-term gains at half the ordinary
rate would produce a maximum tax rate of 35%. However, a special
provision, the Alternative Tax Computation, permitted the taxpayer to
limit the marginal tax rate on at least some capital gains to 25%. Al-
though generally described as having "effectively truncated the tax
rate schedule,"
1 careful analysis of the data suggests that this was not
the case. This section describes the operation and limitations of the
alternative tax computation.
Prior to 1970, taxpayers were allowed to choose one of two tax
computation methods. The first, called the regular method, involved
using the ordinary tax rate schedule to compute tax on the taxpayer's
total amount of taxable income including taxable capital gains. The
second, the alternative tax computation method, involved using the
ordinary tax rate schedule to compute the tax on non-capital gains
income plus paying tax equal to 50% of the taxable portion of capital
gains. As only half of long-term gains are taxable, the effective tax rate
becomes 25%.
Figure 3.1 shows how the alternative tax computation should work.
The figure plots taxable income along the horizontal axis and marginal
tax rate along the vertical axis. The tax code exhibits the upward
sloping form shown with the normal tax liability represented by the
area of the triangle. In this case, the taxpayer's other income is suf-
ficient to get him over the 50% bracket amount, and he pays tax liability73 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
50%
ORDINARY INCOME CAPITAL GAINS
Fig. 3.1 Alternative tax computation limits capital gains tax
rate to 50%.
indicated by area A on his ordinary income. In addition, the taxpayer
pays 50% on the included portion of capital gains. This is indicated by
area B. The total tax saving to this taxpayer from the alternative tax
computation is area C, and his marginal tax rate on capital gains is
limited to 25%.
Now consider the case shown in figure 3.2. Here, the taxpayer's total
taxable income is enough to be taxed at a rate over 50%, but his non-
capital gains income is not. The taxpayer has a choice. He can elect
to be taxed under the regular tax rate schedule, in which case his tax
liability is the large triangle, or he can elect the alternative tax com-
putation. If he chooses the alternative tax computation, tax is levied
by the ordinary schedule on his non-capital gains income, equal to area
D. In addition, he pays tax at a 50% rate on the included portion of
capital gains, indicated by areas E and F. As area E indicates, a portion
of the taxpayer's long-term gains are taxed at a rate higher than they
ORDINARY INCOME CAPITAL GAINS
Fig. 3.2 Alternative tax computation fails to limit capital gains tax
rate to 50%.74 Lawrence B. Lindsey
would be under the normal tax rate schedule. This taxpayer elects the
alternative tax computation only if it results in a tax savings. In this
case, such a situation results only if area E is less than area G.
Consider a taxpayer situation where this is the case. The taxpayer
realizes long-term gains of $200,000 and has other income of $50,000.
In addition, he has itemized deductions of $40,000. The taxpayer ex-
cludes half of the long-term gains from tax, leaving an adjusted gross
income (AGI) of $150,000, and then subtracts itemized deductions to
produce a taxable income of $110,000. Under the tax schedule of the
era (1965-69), the ordinary tax computation would produce a tax lia-
bility of $51,380. Using the alternative tax computation, he would pay
ordinary tax on the first $10,000, equal to $1,820, plus a 50% tax on
the $100,000 of included gains, producing a total tax liability of $51,820.
This taxpayer would elect to be taxed under the ordinary schedule
as it produces a lower tax liability. However, the marginal tax rate
under this schedule is 62%, producing a marginal tax rate on capital
gains of 31%. In this case, the alternative tax computation did not
effectively limit the tax rate on long-term gains to 25%. An effective
tax rate limit of 25% would require that the last $25,000 of included
capital gains be taxed at 50%, rather than the first $25,000.
Although a majority of taxpayers in upper-income brackets who re-
alized long-term gains did avail themselves of the alternative tax com-
putation method, a significant fraction did not. For example, in 1966,
of 27,766 taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes between $100,000 and
$200,000, more than one quarter did not elect the alternative tax com-
putation. The same was true for 16% of taxpayers with adjusted gross
incomes between $200,000 and $500,000 with net long-term capital
gains, and for 7.5% of taxpayers in the same situation with adjusted
gross income over $500,000.
2
The data are not sufficient to indicate the reason why these taxpayers
elected the ordinary tax computation. It should be noted, however,
that taxpayers are less likely to choose the alternative tax computation
as long-term gains rise as a share of income. An extreme example would
be a taxpayer with negative ordinary taxable income but large amounts
of positive capital gains. This could be due to net operating losses in
a business or partnership or to itemized deductions such as state taxes,
interest, and charitable contributions, exceeding his ordinary income.
The ordinary tax computation effectively permits this taxpayer to shel-
ter that portion of his long-term gain which offsets the negative part
of his ordinary taxable income. But, under the alternative tax com-
putation, the tax on this negative portion of income would be zero,
while the tax on the included portion of capital gains would be at the
full 50% rate.75 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
Thus, in certain situations, taxpayers with a substantial capital gain
may still find themselves excluded from the alternative tax computa-
tion. The effect of this on the average marginal tax rate on taxpayers
with net long-term gains was an increase of 1.5 percentage points above
the 25% theoretical maximum for taxpayers in the $100,000 to $500,000
income range.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 changed the alternative tax computation
by limiting the 25% rate to a maximum of $50,000 in net long-term
gains. Thus, only $25,000 of the included half of long-term gains qual-
ified for the "special" 50% rate. In 1970, the excess over this amount
was taxed at a maximum rate of 59%. This maximum tax rate was
raised to 65% in 1971 and the limit was removed completely in 1972
and later years.
The actual alternative tax computation was constructed to minimize
the potential benefits to the taxpayer. Figure 3.3 shows the method of
computation for a taxpayer who would receive some benefit from the
computation. The tax owed was comprised of three parts. The first
part, denoted as area H, was the tax owed on the taxpayer's ordinary
taxable income. This corresponds to area A in figure 3.1. The second
part, denoted as area I, was a 50% tax on the first $25,000 of the included
portion of capital gains. If the included portion of the taxpayer's gains
was less than $25,000, then the effective marginal tax rate on these
gains was 25%, and no further computation is necessary. If capital
gains exceeded $25,000, then the tax computation included a third part,
denoted as area J. This was the difference between (a) the tax calculated
using the ordinary computation on the taxpayer's total taxable income
and (b) the tax calculated using the ordinary computation on the sum
of $25,000 plus the taxpayer's non-capital gains taxable income.
ORDINARY INCOME FIRST $25000 EXCESS
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Fig. 3.3 Modified alternative minimum tax limits tax rate on some
capital gains.76 Lawrence B. Lindsey























If the taxpayer did not elect the alternative tax computation, his tax
would have been the total area under the ordinary tax schedule, denoted
as areas H, I, J, and K. The net tax savings to the taxpayer was therefore
area K. Note that for any taxpayer with more than $25,000 of included
capital gains, the marginal tax rate on gains was the same as it would
have been had there been no alternative tax computation. Thus, to the
extent that capital gains realizations are based on marginal incentives,
the alternative tax computation had no effect on a substantial number
of taxpayers. Table 3.1 provides estimates of the revenue loss from
this provision of an inframarginal tax reduction to recipients of capital
gains.
The change in the alternative tax computation to limit special treat-
ment to only $25,000 of included gains also had the effect of lowering
the fraction of taxpayers electing the alternative computation, even
among taxpayers with more than $25,000 of capital gains. Figure 3.4
Fig. 3.4
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Modified alternative minimum tax fails to lower taxes on
capital gains.77 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
shows a taxpayer situation in which it may not be in the interest of the
taxpayer to elect the alternative tax computatioa. The taxpayer must
pay tax above the statutory rate on a portion of his gains in the hope
that this will offset a lower rate on some of the rest of his gains. This
taxpayer would owe tax equal to areas L, M, N, and O. Under the
ordinary tax computation he would owe taxes on L, M, O, and P. The
taxpayer thus elects the alternative tax computation only if area N is
smaller than area P.
The effect of this change in the alternative computation was to limit
the marginal incentive to a minority of taxpayers in income groups with
high marginal rates. Table 3.2 shows the fraction of taxpayers in high-
income groups with net long-term capital gains who did not receive a
marginal benefit from the alternative tax computation and the reason
why. In only one income group in one year did a majority receive a
marginal rate reduction.
There are two reasons for this ineffectiveness. First, it was impos-
sible for any taxpayer with more than $25,000 in gains to benefit at the
margin. Second, taxpayers with relatively small amounts of non-capital
gains taxable income would also not benefit regardless of the size of
their capital gains income. This limited alternative tax computation was
therefore of marginal benefit only to taxpayers with relatively small
amounts of capital gains income and relatively large amounts of other
income. However, as noted above, much of the effect was inframarginal
with regard to a taxpayer's decision making, while costing significant
amounts of revenue.
3.1.2 The Additional Minimum Tax
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 began the Additional Tax for Tax Pref-
erences, also known as the minimum tax. The excluded portion of
Table 3.2 Percent of Capital Gains Taxpayers with AGI over $100,000
Using Alternative Tax Computation
Alternative
Reduced Capital Gains No Effect on Computation
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capital gains was among a list of 9 types of income, termed preferences,
which came under tlje minimum tax. The additional minimum tax was
levied in two forms, one from 1970 through 1975 and one from 1976
through 1978. We consider each in turn.
The early form of the tax was levied at a 10% rate on the items of
tax preference reduced by an exclusion of $30,000 plus the taxpayer's
ordinary tax liability and some other deductions discussed later. The
effect of this was to make the taxpayer's additional tax rate negatively
related to his ordinary tax rate. In the case of the capital gains tax
preference, the additional tax rate was negatively related to the effec-
tive capital gains tax rate. This was true whether the taxpayer elected
the alternative or the regular method of tax computation.
Consider a taxpayer with substantial preference income who realizes
an additional dollar of net long-term capital gains. The excluded portion
of the gains, 50 cents, enters the minimum tax base as a tax preference.
This 50 cents is offset by the amount the taxpayer's ordinary tax liability
increased. This ordinary tax liability is increased by the remaining part
of the capital gain, which is taxed either at the ordinary rate, or at 50%
if the alternative tax computation is effective. Thus, the higher ordinary
tax liability is either half the taxpayer's ordinary tax rate or 25 cents
for the alternative tax. So, the 50 cent increase in capital gains pref-
erence could be offset by a 25% ordinary capital gains tax rate, raising
the additional tax base by 25 cents on net. The 10% additional tax rate
is applied to the net increase in the tax base, raising his marginal tax
rate on the added dollar of capital gain by 2.5 cents.
If, on the other hand, the effective tax rate on capital gains is 35%,
the minimum tax base would only rise by 15 cents for every dollar of
long-term gains realized. The additional minimum tax in this situation
would only be 1.5 percentage points. Figure 3.5 shows the relationship
between the marginal tax rate on the included portion of capital gains
and the additional tax rate.
The additional minimum tax had a feature which reduced its effec-
tiveness over time. Taxpayers were allowed to carry forward from any
year after 1970 the excess of ordinary tax over net preferences and
apply the amount carried forward against the current year's net tax
preferences. For example, suppose a taxpayer had ordinary tax liability
of $50,000 in 1971 and tax preferences in the same year, after the $30,000
exclusion, of $40,000. He owed no minimum tax because his ordinary
tax liability exceeded his preferences by $10,000. That $10,000 could
be carried forward to 1972 to offset his tax preferences in that year.
So, if he had a $30,000 ordinary tax liability in 1972 and $40,000 in
preferences after the exclusion, he would owe no minimum tax in 1972
either. Taxes in excess of preferences could be carried forward for up
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Fig. 3.5 Effect of pre-1976 additional minimum tax on capital gains
tax rate.
Table 3.3 shows the effect of the additional minimum tax on the
marginal tax rate on capital gains. The effect of carrying forward is
clearly evident. In 1970, taxpayers in the $200,000-$500,000 income
class faced an increased marginal tax rate on capital gains of 1.18
percentage points as a result of the additional minimum tax. By 1975,
the effect of the additional minimum tax on the average marginal tax
rate on capital gains was only 0.24 percentage points, or about 80%
less. The reason for this was that substantial numbers of taxpayers had
amassed amounts carried forward sufficient to exempt them from the
minimum tax. In 1970, some 62% of all recipients of net capital gains
with AGI between $200,000 and $500,000 paid some additional tax. By
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1975, only 13% of capital gains recipients in the same income category
paid the additional tax.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 made substantial changes in the mini-
mum tax which greatly increased its scope. The sums carried forward
from previous years was ended altogether. Two preferences were added,
one for intangible drilling costs and one for itemized deductions in
excess of 60% of adjusted gross income. The tax rate was raised to
15% and the exclusion lowered to the greater of $10,000 or one half of
ordinary tax liability. The IRS estimates that this resulted in an elev-
enfold increase in the number of taxpayers paying the minimum tax
and a sixfold increase in minimum tax revenues.
3
The 1976 changes in the minimum tax raised the average effective
tax rate on capital gains in two ways. First, it increased the number
of taxpayers subject to the additional levy of the minimum tax, as the
above figures indicate. Second, it increased the addition to the effective
tax rate caused by the minimum tax for each minimum taxpayer. Figure
3.6 illustrates how this new minimum tax affected the marginal tax rate
on capital gains.
If a taxpayer received an additional dollar of net long-term capital
gains, the 50 cents excluded from the ordinary tax was treated as a tax
preference. The remaining 50 cents raised the ordinary tax the taxpayer
paid. Half of the increase in ordinary tax was used as an offset against
preference income rather than the full amount of ordinary tax as in the
1969 law. So, if the taxpayer were in the 50% tax bracket, the additional
dollar of capital gains would raise his ordinary taxes by 25 cents and
his offset by 12.5 cents. In this case, the taxpayer's additional minimum
tax base would rise by 37.5 cents. This base is taxed at a 15% rate,
4.875%
0% ORDINARY INCOME TAX RATE 70%
Fig. 3.6 Effect of post-1976 additional minimum tax on capital gains
tax rate.81 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
meaning that the taxes paid on the additional dollar of capital gains is
increased by 5.625 cents.
As was the case before 1976, the additional taxes paid fall as the
taxpayer's ordinary marginal tax rate rises. If a taxpayer's ordinary
tax rate was 70% and the alternative tax computation was not effective
at the margin, the ordinary tax would rise by 35 cents for every dollar
of capital gains realized. This would mean a 17.5 cent offset against
the additional 50 cents in tax preferences. The resulting 32.5 cent in-
crease in the minimum tax base means that the minimum tax raised
the effective tax rate on capital gains by 4.875 cents.
The additional tax had its greatest effect on the marginal tax rate on
capital gains in 1977. In that year it raised the average capital gains
rate in the top bracket by 4.6 percentage points. Some 92% of capital
gains recipients with AGI over $1,000,000 were subject to the additional
minimum tax in that year. The effect of the additional tax was much
less in the top brackets in 1978. In that year only 52% of the recipients
of capital gains in the over $1,000,000 income group paid additional
tax. The reason for this is probably the tax legislation which moved
through Congress that year. The additional minimum tax was eliminated
beginning in January 1979. Tax-conscious investors may well have post-
poned their realizations to take account of this (and other) changes in
the tax law which had the effect of lowering the capital gains tax rate.
The additional minimum tax interacted with other provisions of the
tax code. As already noted, taxpayers electing the alternative tax com-
putation would face higher additional minimum taxes on their capital
gains than taxpayers who computed their tax according to the regular
tax rate schedule. The additional minimum tax also interacted with the
maximum tax on personal service income in a manner which increased
the effective tax rate on capital gains income.
3.1.3 Maximum Tax on Personal Service Income
The Maximum Tax on Personal Service Income, otherwise known
as the "maximum tax" was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1969. Its objective was to reduce the effective tax rate on wage, salary,
and professional income below that on other types of income. Instead
of the statutory 70% top rate, the top rate on personal service income
was set at 60% in 1971 and 50% thereafter. As Lindsey (1981) showed,
the maximum tax was ineffective at achieving these objectives for the
vast majority of high-income taxpayers. However, a complex inter-
action between the maximum tax and other provisions of the tax law
had the effect of raising the effective capital gains tax rate for many
taxpayers.
Between 1971 and 1976, every dollar of preference income in excess
of the additional tax exclusion (see above sec. 3.1.2) reduced the amount82 Lawrence B. Lindsey
of earned income eligible for the lower rate by one dollar. In effect,
every dollar of capital gains received over a certain threshold converted
50 cents of earned income into unearned income for purposes of the
maximum tax. As the tax rate on earned income could be as low as
50% and the tax rate on unearned income as high as 70%, this had the
effect of adding as much as 10% to the effective capital gains tax rate.
This interaction between capital gains and the maximum tax is known
as "poisoning."
During this era there were two types of maximum tax poisoning
caused by the receipt of capital gains. The first type, described above,
involved the receipt of preference income above a threshold. The sec-
ond involved an absolute limit on the amount of income eligible for
treatment as earned income. This limit equalled taxable income minus
the included portion of capital gains. Consider an example. A taxpayer
has $200,000 in earned income and a total capital gain of $300,000 of
which 50%, or $150,000, is included in income, making AGI a total of
$350,000. The taxpayer has itemized deductions of $100,000. Therefore,
the taxpayer's taxable income is $250,000. This second type of poi-
soning would limit the amount of income eligible for earned income
treatment to $100,000, or taxable income less the included portion of
capital gains.
The actual interaction of capital gains and the maximum tax is quite
complex. This complexity would generally produce a rate of poisoning
slightly lower than that described above. The amount of income eligible
for treatment as earned income, known as earned taxable income (ETI),
is given by the following formula:
(1) ETI = (PSINC/AGI) x TAXINC - PREFERENCES.
In this equation PSINC, or personal service income, equals income
from wages, salaries, and professional income. TAXINC, or taxable
income, is apportioned between earned and unearned portions accord-
ing to the share of AGI contributed by PSINC. Earned taxable income
is then reduced by the amount of preference income, including the
excluded portion of capital gains. This latter subtraction represents the
"poisoning" effect described above.
However, the derivative of ETI with respect to a change in capital
gains shows that there is an offset to this poisoning as well:
JETI _ 0.5 PSINC(AGI - TAXINC)
(
 } </CAPGN " AGP
Using the chain rule and the fact that an additional dollar of capital
gains realizations increases AGI, TAXINC, and PREFERENCES by
50 cents each, we find that the change in ETI for a change in capital83 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
gains depends on the ratios of ETI—TAXINC and PSINC to AGI.
Most important is the fact that TAXINC is less than AGI. Therefore,
the term in parentheses is positive. This in turn implies that ETI falls
by less than the 50 cent change in preferences when capital gains
increase. So, the interaction of the maximum tax and capital gains
realizations means that the taxpayer was poisoned but also received a
partial antidote.
The effect described by (2) was designed to allocate personal ex-
emptions and itemized deductions between earned and other income.
Moving a dollar of earned income into the unearned category will shift
this allocation of personal exemptions and itemized deductions, pro-
viding the partially offsetting effect. However, this partial antidote was
only effective if the taxpayer had preference income in excess of the
preference exclusion. It was not effective in cases where the taxpayer's
ETI was more than his TAXINC less included capital gains.
In 1977 the scope of poisoning was increased. Beginning in that year,
all preference income regardless of source was used to offset ETI
whether or not it exceeded the preference exclusion of the additional
tax. Thus, although this change had no effect on the marginal capital
gains tax rate of a poisoned taxpayer, the number of taxpayers who
were poisoned was increased.
Table 3.4 presents calculations of the percentage point increase in
the effective tax rate on capital gains due to the poisoning effect of the
maximum tax. The effect of the 1977 changes is clear. In 1976, taxpayers
in the $100,000-$200,000 income group had average marginal tax rates
raised 0.34 percentage points by the maximum tax. In 1977, this jumped
sixfold to 2.25 percentage points. Poisoning of the maximum tax was
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3.1.4 Alternative Minimum Tax
The Tax Reform Act of 1978 removed capital gains from the list of
preferences subject to the additional minimum tax beginning in 1979.
Instead, an alternative minimum tax was established which combined
the excluded portion of capital gains, itemized deductions in excess of
60% of AGI, and the taxpayer's regular taxable income in its base.
Taxes were levied at graduated rates of 10%, 20%, and 25% on this
alternative tax base. The taxpayer paid the greater of his regular tax
liability or his alternative tax liability.
Since the full amount of capital gains was in the alternative tax base,
these three rates became the effective tax rate on capital gains for
taxpayers who paid the alternative tax. These tax rates are generally
lower than the ordinary capital gains rates, which could be as high as
28%, and so the alternative minimum tax had the effect of lowering
the marginal tax rate on capital gains, even though the average tax rate
paid by alternative minimum taxpayers was increased by the provision.
Nearly all alternative minimum taxpayers with AGI over $200,000
paid taxes at the 25% effective tax rate. In the $100,000-$200,000
income class this fell to about three-fourths of taxpayers paying the
alternative minimum tax, with the average alternative minimum rate in
this group at 23.6%. The average rate was only 17.6% in the $50,000-
$100,000 income group.
The net result of the alternative minimum tax was to reduce the
average marginal tax rate on capital gains in the top income groups by
about 1.0 percentage point in 1979, and about 0.4 percentage points in
1980, But, because the top regular capital gains rate averaged 24% in
1981, the effect of the minimum tax was to increase the average marginal
tax rate by about 0.2 percentage points that year. Other income groups
had tax rate changes of about 0.2 percentage points as a result of the
alternative minimum tax.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 eliminated the 25% tax
bracket on the alternative minimum tax. This meant that, beginning in
1982, alternative minimum taxpayers faced the same effective tax rate
on capital gains as ordinary taxpayers—20%.
3.1.5 Combined Effects
Table 3.5 presents calculations of the average effective tax rate faced
by taxpayers with net long-term gains in excess of short-term losses.
The calculations were based on the tax computation status of taxpayers
with such gains as reported in the Statistics of Income. The calculations
weighted all taxpayers equally within a given income class in order to
minimize the simultaneity between the tax rate and the level of reali-
zations. The tax rate estimates include the effects of the interactions














































































































































Also included in the tax rate estimates are the effects of the changes
in the exclusion rate in the 1978 tax bill and the maximum capital gains
rate in the 1981 tax bill. The 1978 act increased the rate of exclusion
of net long-term gains from 50% to 60% for all assets sold after
31 October 1978. The figures for 1978 therefore take a weighted average
of tax rates implied by the two exclusion rates in proportion to the
fraction of the year each exclusion rate was in effect. In other words,
a weight of .833 was attached to the rates applicable to a 50% exclusion
and a weight of .167 was attached to the rates applicable to a 60%
exclusion.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduced the maximum tax
rate on capital gains to 20% for all assets sold after 9 June 1981. The
1981 rates therefore reflect a weighted average of rates which ranged
up to the old maximum of 28% for half the year and 20% for the other
half of the year. In this case, equal weights were attached to the two
tax rate scenarios.
The data show that the maximum capital gains tax rate increased
rapidly between 1967 and 1977 and decreased rapidly thereafter. These
data provide a significant amount of variance in the tax rate term. The
next section describes how these data were combined with data on
wealth to estimate the sensitivity of taxpayers to changes in the capital
gains tax rate.86 Lawrence B. Lindsey
3.2 Capital Gains and the Value of Personal Assets
The level of capital gains realizations has been going up throughout
the period of this study, 1965-82. Table 3.6 presents the nominal value
of net long-term capital gains realizations in each of the 18 years en-
compassed by this study. Net long-term realizations in 1982 were more
than 4 times their 1965 level. Of the 18 years listed, 12 were higher
than the preceding year. This includes 1965, which was higher than
(unlisted) 1964.
This general upward trend was marked by a number of discontinu-
ities. Capital gains in 1969 and 1970 were well below the values of 1968.
Net realizations were also lower in 1974 and 1975 than in 1973. The
years 1969 and 1970 were associated with higher tax rates than pre-
ceding years due to the Vietnam War surtax. The year 1970 was as-
sociated with a decline in the stock market, as were 1974 and 1975.
On the other hand, very rapid growth in capital gains realizations
occurred between 1978 and 1979. Net long-term gains in 1979 were
45% greater than in 1978. However, 1979 was associated with only a
very modest advance in stock prices. The sharp decline in capital gains
tax rates appears to be a primary factor in this advance in realizations.
Capital gains realizations in 1978 may also have been depressed in
anticipation of the cuts in 1979, increasing the apparent percentage rise
in realizations.






































86.187 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
The debate over the importance of capital gains rates in determining
realizations is complicated by changes in the value of personal wealth
including accrued but unrealized capital gains. The objective of this
section is to estimate values for personal wealth holdings in order to
control for this factor in determining the role that capital gains tax rates
play in realizations.
The Federal Reserve Board issues a quarterly Flow of Funds report
on the holdings of various sectors of the U.S. economy. These figures
contain detailed balance sheets and reconciliation statements for the
asset holdings of households, government, and corporations. The pres-
ent study uses the values of wealth holdings by households.
The components of household wealth include many elements on
which households either cannot or probably will not realize capital
gains. For example, holdings of cash and checking and savings deposits
do not include the possibility of capital gains. Capital gains accruing
to households via financial intermediaries such as life insurance and
pension funds are also not reported as capital gains when the taxpayer
files his tax return. Capital gains in pension funds, including IRA and
Keogh accounts, are reported as pension income when the funds are
dispersed after retirement.
We therefore chose to divide household wealth into two components:
those readily tradable and subject to potential capital gains realizations
and those unlikely to be subject to such realizations. This section con-
siders each in turn.
3.2.1 Tradable Wealth
Tradable wealth is comprised of those assets on which capital gains
are regularly realized. The IRS has tabulated the distribution of capital
gains by type or asset. Table 3.7 provides the percentage breakdown
of sales of capital assets by the number of transactions and the value
of net gains. The data show that sales of corporate stock, real estate,
and capital gains income which passes through to the individual tax-
payer from small business corporations, proprietorships, and partner-
ships comprise some 97% of the value of net capital gains.
In the context of the data in the Flow of Funds, these categories
include land, residential structures, corporate equities, and equity in
noncorporate businesses. This latter category includes the value of
nonresidential real estate held by households. Tangible assets such as
consumer durables, on which capital gains are rarely reported, were
excluded from this study.
These traded assets have tended to comprise about two-thirds of all
household wealth over the period studied. This share varied from a
high of 69% in 1968 to a low of 65% in 1975. The most variable com-
ponent of this traded wealth is household holdings of corporate equities,88 Lawrence B. Lindsey







































Note: This table was calculated from table 1.9 of the Department of Treasury's report
to the Congress on the capital gains tax reductions of 1978, pp. 18-19.
which fell from nearly 23% of total wealth in 1968 to only 9.5% in 1979.
The rapid decline in the holding of corporate equity was offset by
increased holding of real estate. Nonresidential real estate peaked at
39.4% of household wealth in 1979, up from a low of 28% at the be-
ginning of the period being studied.
Because of this variation in the components of personal wealth over
time, we apportioned household wealth among the six income groups
studied on a component-by-component basis. Each component was
allocated according to the distribution of income reported on tax returns
likely to flow from that component of household wealth. For example,
the distribution of corporate equities in a given year was assumed to
be the same as the distribution of dividends in that year. The sum of
net rental income and net rental loss was used to apportion real estate
wealth. Noncorporate business wealth was apportioned by combining
net profits and net losses from proprietorships, partnerships, and small
business corporations.
The key advantage of this apportioning technique was that the shares
of wealth were determined from the same data base as the data on the
level and distribution of capital gains realizations. Observations on
individual income classes in each year were therefore independent of
observations from other years. Capital gains income was excluded from
the apportionment process to avoid simultaneity. At the same time, the
aggregate level of wealth was determined independently of the data on
capital gains realizations. Table 3.8 presents the level of tradable wealth














































































































































One potential criticism of this approach is the allocation of corporate
equity on the basis of dividends received. If there are clientele effects
based on tax rates, this approach would tend to underestimate the value
of corporate equities held by upper-income groups since these groups
keep a smaller portion of their dividends after tax relative to capital
gains than do other groups. However, an upward revaluation of wealth
in upper-income groups to reflect this possibility would put downward
pressure on the realizations-to-wealth ratio among taxpayer groups
with high marginal tax rates. This would in turn suggest a greater impact
of capital gains tax rates on realizations. We elected to ignore possible
clientele effects in order to err on the side of conservatism in estimating
the effects of capital gains tax rates.
The Flow of Funds data also includes reconciliation statements which
explain the change in sectoral asset holdings from year to year. Holdings
of a particular asset could vary for one of two reasons: net purchases
or sales of the asset by the household sector or a change in the price
of the existing stock of holdings. This latter effect is termed "reval-
uation" and for purposes of this study was used as a measure of un-
realized capital gains on assets held by households.
We allocated the revaluation of each asset in the same manner as
the stock of wealth held in that asset. Revaluation values were com-90 Lawrence B. Lindsey
puted for holding periods up to 7 years. These were converted into
inflation-adjusted terms by increasing the nominal value of the asset
held at the beginning of the revaluation period to reflect prices at the
end of the revaluation period. A real value was obtained by subtracting
this from what the value of the assets held at the end of the revaluation
would have been if no net purchases had been made. In practice,
revaluation periods over one year turned out not to be significant in
estimating the level of capital gains. The data suggested that much of
these multiyear revaluations was picked up in the value of wealth.
3.2.2 Nontraded Wealth
Nontraded wealth was comprised mainly of cash, interest-bearing
financial assets, and life insurance and pension fund reserves. Over the
period being studied, pension and life insurance reserves remained a
roughly constant share of household wealth at about 11%. Cash and
checking accounts declined from a bit over 3% of wealth to a bit under
3%. Interest-bearing financial assets tended to absorb any fluctuations
in the share of nontraded wealth in total wealth.
As in the case of traded assets, we allocated these nontradable assets
on a component-by-component basis as well. Cash and checking ac-
counts were allocated in proportion to adjusted gross income. Interest-
bearing financial assets were allocated in proportion to interest income.
Pension and life insurance reserves were allocated in proportion to the
sum of interest and dividend income.
Again, the key advantage of this apportioning technique was that the
shares of wealth were determined from the same data base as the level
and distribution of capital gains. Independence of observations for
individual income classes in each year was maintained. And the ag-
gregate level of wealth was determined independently of the data on
capital gains realizations.
No revaluations of nontraded assets were necessary. Revaluation of
cash, checking accounts, and saving deposits is impossible. The Flow
of Funds accounts do not provide revaluations for any interest-bearing
assets, maintaining each priced at par. Although some degree of re-
valuation may actually have occurred as a result of fluctuating interest
rates, it is likely to have been quite small. All credit market instruments
comprised only 9% of total financial assets in 1982. This included short-
duration assets such as commercial paper on which no capital gain or
loss was likely.
The next section uses this data on the level and distribution of house-
hold wealth in estimating the determinants of capital gains realizations.
Wealth and revaluation values for given years were obtained by av-
eraging the values at the beginning and at the end of the year. All of
the values for wealth and revaluations were converted into real terms
using the average value of the GNP deflator for the year in question.91 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
3.3 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
The preceding two sections described the derivation of data on capital
gains tax rates, realizations, and the level and distribution of personal
wealth. The objective of this section is to estimate the effect of tax
rates on capital gains realizations and therefore on capital gains revenues.
The basic regression equation we estimate is:
(3) In LTGij = p0 + 3i MTR&- + p2 In TRD,-,
+ £3 In NTRDy + p4 In REV^ + e,-,.
In each case the subscript j represents one of the 6 income classes and
the subscript i represents one of the 18 years being studied. LTG rep-
resents net long-term gains deflated by the GNP deflator where 1972
is valued at 100. MTR is the average marginal tax rate on net long-
term gains. TRD represents the real value of tradable wealth. NTRD
is the real value of wealth which is not readily traded. REV represents
the revaluation of assets during the year i expressed in terms of 1972
prices. In the case of the wealth variables, midyear values were used.
These were obtained by taking an average of end-of-year and beginning-
of-year values.
The results of ordinary least squares regression of the data on the


















All four coefficients were significant except for the intercept term,
which was not significantly different from zero. The adjusted /^-square
value for the regression was 0.8825.
The value for the tax rate parameter should be interpreted as saying
that a 1.0 percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate produces
a 6.2% decline in the level of long-term capital gains realizations. This
represents a semielasticity format, not a pure elasticity one.
The parameter for tradable wealth should be interpreted as an elas-
ticity. A 1% higher level of tradable wealth implies a 1.1% higher level
of long-term gains realizations. The parameter estimate is within one
standard error of a value of unity. In the absence of tax effects, and
short-term market fluctuations, a value of unity would be expected.
The parameter for nontraded wealth should also be interpreted as
an elasticity. In this case, a 1% increase in nontraded wealth decreases
net long-term capital gains realizations by 0.87%. A negative value on92 Lawrence B. Lindsey
this parameter can be understood in the context of what comprises
nontraded wealth. A substantial portion of this wealth represents highly
liquid assets such as cash, savings and checking deposits, and govern-
ment securities. If long-term capital gains realizations are designed to
raise cash for consumption purposes, we would expect to see reali-
zations negatively correlated with the existing level of these liquid
assets.
The final parameter value also represents an elasticity. A 1% increase
in the revaluation of traded assets in a given year increases net capital
gains realizations by 0.3%. This parameter suggests that increases in
stock, business, or real estate prices prompt increased realizations.
Note that this is in addition to the increase in realizations due to a
higher level of wealth. So, for example, in a year in which there is a
20% rise in the value of traded assets we could expect capital gains
realizations to be higher by a total of about 28%, 22% due to the higher
level of wealth and 6% due to the price increases in that year. If prices
remained stable in later years, capital gains realizations would fall 6%
in the following year to maintain a new, permanent level of gains 22%
higher than the initial level.
Before exploring the robustness of these results, consider an addi-
tional interpretation for the tax rate parameter. In the case of a single
tax rate, capital gains tax receipts are the product of the capital gains
tax rate and capital gains realizations. Capital gains tax revenues are
maximized when a given percent increase in the capital gains tax rate
just offsets an equal percentage decline in realizations resulting from
the highest rate.
In the context of the parameters estimated in (3), revenue maximi-
zation occurs when the capital gains tax rate times the tax rate param-
eter, 3i, equals negative unity. The revenue-maximizing capital gains
tax rate implied by the results of the regression is 16.1%. The range
of revenue-maximizing tax rates within one standard error of the es-
timate goes from 14.3% to 18.5%. This range is below the current top
capital gains tax rate of 20%. Other specifications presented below
support this general conclusion.
It should be noted that there is nothing "optimal" about a tax rate
at a revenue-maximizing level. All tax rates above this level are simply
counterproductive from the point of view of raising revenue. Stated
differently, the shadow price of raising additional revenue at this top
tax rate is infinite. Only tax rates below this revenue-maximizing point
are within the possible range of optimality.
The robustness of this result can be examined by considering the
effect of changing the specification of the regression equation. Tests of
alternatives were therefore carried out. Equation (4) drops the variable
representing revaluations of traded assets:93 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
(4) In LTG = 0.874 - 7.394 MTR
(0.397) (0.750)
+ 1.246 In TRD - 0.971 In NTRD .
(0.104) (0.088)
Standard errors are in parentheses below the parameter estimates. The
adjusted i?-square for this regression is 0.8693. The standard errors
show that each coefficient is statistically significant.
In this case, the parameter value for the marginal tax rate term is
increased to 7.39. This implies a revenue-maximizing marginal tax rate
on capital gains of 13.5%. Much of the effect of dropping the gains
parameter appears to have been picked up in the traded-wealth param-
eter, as we would expect.
The effect of dropping the non-traded-wealth term moves the tax
rate parameter in the opposite direction, as (5) shows:
(5) In LTG = -0.282 - 5.076 MTR + 0.124 TRD + 0.564 REV .
(0.715) (1.077) (0.053) (0.110)
All parameter estimates except for the intercept remain significant, but
the /^-square value for this regression drops to 0.775. This suggests
that nontraded wealth contributes to the regression specification. The
parameter on the tax rate variable implies a revenue-maximizing capital
gains tax rate almost exactly equal to the current 20% level.
Dropping both the non-traded-assets variable and the revaluation
variable produces a result indicated by (6):
(6) In LTG = 2.468 - 7.326 MTR + 0.191 TRD .
(0.543) (1.097) (0.058)
Again, the parameter estimates are significant, but the /^-square term
falls to 0.720. The parameter estimate for the tax rate term resembles
that for (4) when the revaluation term was also dropped. This reinforces
the relationship between declines in capital gains tax rates and upward
revaluations of the prices of stocks, real estate, and noncorporate
businesses.
A further specification was run which did not differentiate the forms
of wealth held. The results, shown in (7), reinforce the usefulness of
separating wealth into traded and nontraded components.
(7) In LTG = -0.267 - 5.133 MTR
(0.724) (1.092)
+ 0.115 WEALTH + 0.565 REV.
(0.054) (0.111)
The /^-square for this specification was 0.773. The parameters remain
significant although the wealth term shows a lower ^-statistic than in94 Lawrence B. Lindsey
the specifications where traded and nontraded wealth are run sepa-
rately. Again, the MTR parameter implies a revenue-maximizing capital
gains rate of about 20%.
When revaluations are dropped from the specification shown in (7),
the parameter estimate on the tax rate term again rises to a value in
excess of 7.
(8) In LTG = 2.369 - 7.302 MTR + 0.186 WEALTH.
(0.566) (1.120) (0.057)
The /?-square value for this regression is 0.719. Again, the parameter
estimate for the tax rate coefficient resembles that in other cases where
the revaluation term is dropped. The MTR parameter is little affected
by the specification of the wealth term, as long as all of the values for
wealth are included in the regression in some fashion.
A further check on the specification involves running dummy vari-
ables for each year in the period 1966-82 to see if any particular years
are causing the results. The results of the basic specification (equation
1) run with annual dummy variables is:
(9) In LTG = 2.252 - 6.849 MTR + 0.033 TRD + 0.228 NTRD
(0.585) (0.890) (0.116) (0.118)
- 0.231 REV + DUMMIES.
(0.093)
The coefficients on the dummy variables were significant and illus-
trated an underlying time trend reflecting the rising levels of long-term
gains over the period. Inclusion of these annual data reduced the sig-
nificance of the wealth and revaluation coefficients as variations in
these terms were captured on a year-by-year basis. However, the MTR
coefficient remained highly significant and increased in value relative
to the basic specification.
Another specification of the regression is obtained by changing the
tax rate coefficient into an elasticity format. In this case, the natural
log of the portion of the gain which the taxpayer is allowed to keep
becomes the tax parameter. This specification presumes that a given
percentage point reduction in the tax rate, or a given percent reduction
in the same value, will have an effect which varies with the level of
the tax rate.
For example, a reduction in the capital gains tax rate from 25% to
24% implies an increase in the share of the gain the taxpayer keeps
from 75% to 76%. That represents a 1.33% increase in the share kept
by the taxpayer. The same 1 percentage point reduction in tax rate
from 50% to 49% would increase the taxpayer's share from 50% to
51% of the gain, or by 2%. Similarly, a 4% reduction in the tax rate,
from 25% to 24%, and from 50% to 48%, would imply a percent change95 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
in the after-tax share far greater at the higher tax rate (3 times as much)
as at the lower tax rate.
The results of such a specification are:
(10) In LTG = -20.510 + 4.253 In (1 - MTR) + 1.084 In TRD
(2.301) (0.587) (0.110)
- 0.843 In NTRD + 0.346 In REV.
(0.091) (0.085)
Again, all of the parameter values are significant at a high level of
confidence. The /^-square value for this regression is 0.875, suggesting
a nearly equal degree of explanation as the original specification in (3).
The parameter values for the wealth and revaluation terms are also
quite similar to those of (3). The addition of annual dummies raises the
i?-square term to 0.951.
The parameter estimate for the tax rate term requires reinterpreta-
tion. In this case, lower marginal tax rates increase the after-tax share.
So, the positive coefficient again suggests a higher level of realizations
when tax rates are reduced. The revenue-maximizing capital gains tax
rate can be obtained by dividing unity by unity plus the tax rate coef-
ficient. In this case, a revenue-maximizing capital gains tax rate of 19%
is implied.
We would expect a higher revenue-maximizing rate to be implied by
this specification, for a given percentage point reduction has a greater
effect on the tax rate variable in high tax rate observations than in low
tax rate observations. Still, the revenue-maximizing rate is slightly
below the current 20% level.
A final specification of these equations was performed which included
a variable for the change in the capital gains tax rate from the preceding
year. If capital gains tax rates are suddenly reduced, we might expect
a rush to realize gains which were not profitable to realize in earlier
years with higher rates. This is known as the temporary unlocking
phenomenon.
The term DMTR represents the difference between the current year's
marginal tax rate and the preceding year's marginal tax rate. If the tax
rate was lower in the current year, a negative value would result for
DMTR. As we would expect a lower tax rate to increase realizations,
a negative coefficient for DMTR is implied. Equation 11 indicates that
this is the case:
(11) In LTG -0.713 - 5.391 MTR + 1.030 TRD - 0.781 NTRD
(0.533) (0.868) (0.110) (0.097)
+ 0.327 REV - 3.027 DMTR.
(0.084) (1.469)96 Lawrence B. Lindsey
The results suggest that temporary unlocking contributes to the be-
havioral response to lower tax rates, thus enhancing revenue at lower
rates. This implies that the permanent revenue-maximizing rate is higher
than that implied by the earlier equations. The coefficient of 5.39 implies
a revenue-maximizing marginal tax rate of 18.5%, higher than implied
by the initial specification but lower than the current rate of 20%.
In conclusion, these data suggest a high degree of sensitivity of
capital gains realizations to the tax rate imposed on such gains. The
revenue-maximizing tax rate implied by these findings is at or below
the current 20% level. This result is robust to the specification of the
regression equation.
It is important to bear in mind the plausibility of this result in contrast
to most findings about revenue-maximizing tax rates. Taxed commod-
ities such as labor supply will show relatively little response to marginal
tax rate reductions because a relatively high proportion of the maximum
possible level of supply is in the market. By contrast, only a very small
fraction of existing capital gains are realized in a given year.
For example, total capital gains realized in 1982 amounted to a record
$86.1 billion. But, the revaluation in personally held traded assets dur-
ing that year alone was $305.7 billion, implying that only 28.2% of that
year's gains were realized. By contrast, in the high-tax year of 1978,
total realized gains were $48.6 billion out of revaluations during that
year of $693.9 billion. Only 7% of the increase in value in traded assets
in that year was represented by realized gains. (Of course, in both years
the stock of accumulated capital gains was enormous compared to
realizations.)
Clearly the potential for increased capital gains realizations and rev-
enues was substantial in 1978. The taxation of gains at the time of
realization rather than at the time of receipt makes capital gains far
more tax-rate-sensitive than other forms of income.
Notes
1. See, for example, the Department of Treasury's report to the Congress
on the capital gains tax reductions of 1978, p. 35. A similar statement appears
in the description of the alternative tax computation in the Statistics of Income
1966, p. 164: "The effect of this computation was a maximum tax of 25 percent
on net long-term capital gain."
2. This data was derived from the Statistics of Income 1966, p. 94.
3. This data is presented in table 3B of the Statistics of Income 1976, p. 83.97 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
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Comment John H. Makin
Lindsey examines the effects of changes in the average marginal tax
rate on capital gains on the sale of tradable capital assets and conse-
quent realization of capital gains or losses. Lindsey finds that the
revenue-maximizing tax rate on capital gains is quite low, in the vicinity
of 16% to 20%.
Before evaluating Lindsey's final result, it is useful to discuss an
important finding that follows directly from the first two major sections
of his chapter. What emerges from Lindsey's conscientious effort to
measure accurately the average marginal tax rate on capital gains is a
clear idea that over the sample period considered by Lindsey, 1965—
82, no forward-looking investor could possibly have calculated in ad-
vance the tax rate he would have to pay upon realizing a capital gain
on his investment. The alternative tax computation, the additional min-
imum tax, and the maximum tax on personal service income together
with numerous changes in the statutory tax rate levied on nominal
capital gains all combined to make calculation of the actual tax rate on
realization of nominal gains a very difficult task ex post, and an im-
possible one ex ante.
Unfortunately, despite painstaking efforts to measure accurately the
tax rate on marginal realization of net long-term gains, Lindsey over-
looks what is perhaps the major problem in the tax treatment of capital
gains: a failure to index the cost basis for inflation. Therefore, it is
important to realize that even though Lindsey's capital gains realiza-
tions are measured in 1972 dollars, they are not "real capital gains,"
for there is no way to tell whether those realizing gains are selling at
prices that compensate sufficiently for the effects of inflation on real
gains. Another way to make the same point is simply to observe that
it is nominal gains that are taxed, and it makes little difference whether
the nominal gains that are taxed are measured in current dollars or
1972 dollars. Lindsey's analysis still treats identically the investor who
bought an asset at a price of 100 in 1970 and sold it at 200 in 1980 for
zero real gain and the investor who bought the asset at 50 in 1970 and
sold it at 200 in 1980 for a positive real gain.
One interesting question is whether it is possible to determine a bias
in Lindsey's estimate of the revenue-maximizing tax rate on capital
gains. I am inclined to think that it may be biased downward. To see
why, suppose that during Lindsey's sample period the cost basis for
capital gains tax purposes had been indexed. As a result, the rapid
inflation of the 1970s would have produced less "lock-in" on capital
John H. Makin is the director of fiscal policy studies at the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research in Washington, D.C.99 Capital Gains Rates, Realizations, and Revenues
assets. Thus, realizations would have proceeded steadily over time
rather than accumulating in anticipation of a possible opening such as
occurred in 1981, when the maximum tax rate on nominal capital gains
was adjusted downward to 20%. In other words, investors in both real
and financial assets have in the presence of a poorly indexed tax system
come to anticipate ad hoc corrections for mismeasurement of income
from capital or capital gains that result from accelerated rates of inflation.
The same phenomenon appears with respect to measures that affect
the user cost of capital, such as investment tax credits or accelerated
cost recovery schedules. Inflation results in an overstatement of profits
for tax purposes and thereby discourages investment until some ex
post correction is made in the form of front-loaded depreciation mea-
sures like those enacted in 1981. As a result, investment and capital
gains realizations tend to display a choppy pattern in response to the
ebb and flow of ex post corrections made necessary by an absence of
adequate indexing provisions in the area of the tax code that deals with
capital gains and income from capital.
Lindsey's analysis would probably benefit from raising the question
of why capital gains ought to be treated differently from ordinary in-
come. It is sometimes suggested that an adjustment is necessary to
compensate for (a) the likelihood that not all of the nominal gains which
are taxed are not real or (b) the income surge phenomenon that arises
because capital gains are taxed on realization rather than on an accrual
basis.
The corollary to this reasoning is that if only real capital gains were
taxed on an accrual basis in a neutral tax system with a top marginal
rate of 30% or below, there would be no need to treat capital gains any
differently than ordinary income.
A little reflection provides some interesting extensions for Lindsey's
analysis. The most useful question to analyze would be whether his
estimates are sensitive to the level of the inflation rate. That rate is
inversely related to the real gains underlying the nominal gains mea-
sured in 1972 dollars that constitute Lindsey's dependent variable.
Were Lindsey to examine a period of lower inflation or deflation either
in the United States or in some other country, since nominal gains
would represent less of an overstatement of real gains or even an
understatement in a period of deflation, the hypothesis would be that
the measured response of capital gains realizations to a reduction in
the tax rate on nominal gains would be reduced. As a result, Lindsey's
estimate of the revenue-maximizing tax rate on capital gains would be
reduced.
A stylized representation of the situation confronting investors with
capital gains or losses during the 1970s makes clearer the possible
downward bias just referred to in Lindsey's estimate of the revenue-100 Lawrence B. Lindsey
maximizing tax rate on capital gains. Investors with positive nominal
capital gains, those whose sales of assets will yield tax revenue, may
have positive, zero, or negative real gains depending upon the per-
centage appreciation in the asset relative to the percentage increase in
the price level during the holding period. Reductions in the tax rate on
capital gains tend to be anticipated by those following the discussion
of changes in the tax code. Those with positive nominal gains that are
also positive when measured in real terms will postpone realization in
anticipation of a cut in the capital gains tax rate. Part of the lock-in
effect results from the fact that nominal gains overstate real gains, and
a cut in the tax rate on nominal gains can only mitigate the negative
effect on realization of mismeasurement of real gains. At the margin,
the incentive is to increase realizations promptly after the tax rate on
nominal gains is reduced in cases where the lower tax makes it prof-
itable to realize gains and purchase another asset with a higher pretax
return.
The negative effect of inflation on capital gains realizations prior to
ex post adjustments in the tax code is exacerbated not only by the
overstatement of real gains that inflation produces but also by the
bracket creep induced by high rates of inflation in the late 1970s. Here
again there is a tendency to accumulate gains in anticipation of ad-
justment, as the congressional habit of periodically reversing the effects
of bracket creep is well known. Bracket creep, like mismeasurement
of real gains, tends to produce a surge of capital gains realizations
immediately after an ex post adjustment in the tax code which lowers
tax rates on nominal capital gains.
In sum, one should not conclude that in a comprehensive reform of
the tax system, wherein real capital gains are taxed as accrued, Lind-
sey's work suggests that a top marginal rate would be too high. Rather,
what Lindsey's estimates imply is that during inflationary periods when
the mismeasurement of real gains and bracket creep combine seriously
to distort the measurement of capital gains for tax purposes, a very
low tax rate on nominal capital gains is required to carry forward
realizations to a revenue-maximizing level.